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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant, Alvin R. Lundgren and Appellee, Coalville City, bring this appeal from 
the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Decree entered in this case by Third District 
Court Judge Frank G. Noel, after a two day bench trial on the merits. This appeal was filed 
in the Utah Supreme Court which has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure Rules 3 and 4, and pursuant to section 78-2-2 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure this case was 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. IS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO THE EQUITABLE RELIEF 
OF RESCISSION OF THE STIPULATION? 
This issue is a mixed question of law and fact. As to the question of law this 
court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness without according them any 
particular deference. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1988); Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City. 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); Vali 
Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of Health Care Financing. 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah 
App. 1990). With regard to questions of fact Defendant is required to marshall all of the 
evidence that supports the finding and then must demonstrate that the District Court's finding 
is clearly erroneous. Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball. 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990). 
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2. IS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES SUSTAINED AS 
A RESULT OF HIS COMPLIANCE WITH THE STIPULATION? 
This issue presented for review concerns the District Court's Findings of Fact 
regarding damages proved by the Defendant. Defendant is required to marshal 1 all of the 
evidence that supports the finding and then must demonstrate that the District Court's finding 
is clearly erroneous. Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball. 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990). 
3 . DID THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS AS DEFENSES TO 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE STIPULATION HAVE MERIT AND WERE THEY 
ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH? 
This issue involves a mixed question of law and fact. The issue of whether the 
Defendant's claims were "without merit" is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. 
Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993). The issue of whether the Defendant's 
claims were asserted in good faith is a question of fact to be reviewed for abuse of discretion 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
4. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN AWARDING THE 
DEFENDANT PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE DAMAGE AWARD FOR THE 
CITY'S FAILURE TO PURCHASE A SIGN WHERE THE DEFENDANT'S LOSS 
CANNOT BE FIXED AS OF A PARTICULAR TIME, AND WHERE THE 
DEFENDANT DELAYED PROSECUTION OF HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
AGAINST THE CITY FOR 12 YEARS? 
This issue presented for review concerns the District Court's legal conclusions 
regarding the award of pre-judgment interest under a given set of facts. The issue is a 
question of law in which this court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness 
without according them any particular deference. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. 
Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1988); Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City. 752 
2 
P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); VaJi Convalescent & Care lusts, v. Division of Health Care 
Financing. 797 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that: 
"(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith..." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
In 1982 the parties in this case became involved in a dispute over billboards installed 
by the Defendant on Interstate 80 within the Coalville City limits. That dispute resulted in 
the City tiling a lawsuit in 1982. Instead of proceeding to trial to have the issues determined 
by the court, the Plaintiff and the Defendant voluntarily entered into a Stipulation on March 
24, 1983 (the "Stipulation"). 
Under the terms of the Stipulation each party was to perform certain obligations. The 
Defendant has refused to timely perform his obligations as required under the Stipulation. 
Over the course of 13 years the City has been forced to turn to the Courts to enforce the 
terms of the Stipulation each time the Defendant was obligated to perform. The Defendant 
alleges that the City is in material breach of the Stipulation, therefore he is excused from 
performing his duties under the Stipulation. 
This case involves mixed questions of law and fact regarding whether the Defendant is 
entitled to the equitable relief of rescission of the Stipulation, whether the claims of the 
Defendant asserted in defense of enforcement of the Stipulation have merit and were asserted 
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in good faith, and whether the Defendant is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the award of 
damages. 
II. Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This lawsuit was originally filed in 1982 in the Third District Court of Summit 
County, State of Utah. A Stipulation dismissing the lawsuit was signed by the parties and 
approved by the Court in April 1983. Under the terms of the Stipulation, the Defendant was 
required to remove one of his billboards every two years. The Defendant failed and refused 
to comply with the Stipulation each time he was required to remove a sign as agreed. The 
City was forced to instigate legal action to enforce the Defendant's compliance with the 
Stipulation. Every time the City of Coalville commenced legal action to enforce the terms of 
the Stipulation, the Defendant alleged that he was not required to comply with the terms of 
the Stipulation because the City had not fulfilled its obligations under the Stipulation. In each 
instance the Utah Courts, including the Utah Supreme Court in 1987, held that the City had 
substantially performed under the Stipulation and the Defendant was ordered to comply with 
the Stipulation by removing a sign. 
The matter came to trial on August 15 and 16, 1995 in the Third District Court, 
Summit County, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. After a two day trial the Court 
found that the City was obligated to purchase or lease a sign from the Defendant and had 
failed to do so. The Defendant was awarded damages in the amount of 53,890.00. The 
Defendant was also awarded pre-judgment interest on this damage award from January 1, 
1985 to present. The Court held that this was the only measure of damages the Defendant 
had proven. The Court further held that this was not a material breach that would warrant 
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rescission of the Stipulation. The Court further held that while the City had technically failed 
to comply with the other aspects of the Stipulation, these minor breaches did not cause the 
Defendant harm, nor were they material breaches. 
Finally, the Court held that the claims asserted by the Defendant in defense of his 
position that he was excused from performance under the Stipulation were without merit and 
asserted in bad faith. Therefore, the District Court ordered the Defendant to pay the City's 
attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the Stipulation throughout the course of this lawsuit. 
The Defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the Decree which was denied. The 
Defendant thereafter filed an appeal to which the City cross-appealed. The City of Coalville 
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition on which the Supreme Court deferred ruling. The 
matter was then poured over to this Court for disposition. 
III. Statement of Facts. 
1. On April 19, 1982, an action was filed by Coalville City seeking an Order 
permanently enjoining Alvin R. Lundgren and his predecessor All Associates, Inc. (the 
"Defendant") from continuing the existence, operation and maintenance of nine outdoor 
advertising billboard signs placed by Defendant along Interstate 80 in Coalville, Utah. (See 
Record, pages 0001-0004). 
2. At the time the lawsuit was filed, the Defendant had constructed and was 
maintaining nine (9) billboard signs along Interstate 80 within the Coalville City limits. The 
action was filed because the Defendant had failed to obtain the proper permits for the signs 
from the City of Coalville (R. 0001-0004). 
5 
3. On March 24, 1983 the City of Coalville and the Defendant signed a 
Stipulation of Dismissal rather than proceed to trial (the "Stipulation"). The Stipulation was 
submitted to and approved by the court by Order dated April 5, 1983. (R. 0016-0020). 
4. The Stipulation required Coalville City to issue a permit for each of the 
Defendant's nine signs. One of each of such permits should expire on December 31, 1985, 
1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and two of the permits should expire December 31, 
2001. The Stipulation required the Defendant to remove one sign of his choosing each time a 
permit expired. The Stipulation also provided that the Defendant could apply for a renewal 
of any of the permits. However, there was no guarantee of renewal, and Defendant was 
obligated to remove a sign for each expired permit. (R. 0016-0020 and R. 991-992). 
5. It was the City of Coalville who required that the Defendant be issued 
permits with expiration dates. (R. 1634-1638). The Defendant was interested in being 
allowed to keep his signs up for as long as possible, but the City was adamant about being 
able to look to a date when each sign would be removed. (R. 1634-1638). 
6. Sign permits were issued to the Defendant by the City prior to the removal 
of the first sign. (R. 991-992). 
7. The sign permits issued by the City were attached to specific signs, thereby 
facially requiring that certain signs be removed on specific dates. (R. 992). The Stipulation 
required that the Defendant be permitted to choose the order of removal. (R. 0019). The 
Defendant has, at all times, been allowed to sequence the removal of the signs. (R. 992, 
1568-1569, and 1657). 
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8. The Court held that this facial deficiency on the permits did not constitute a 
material breach of the Stipulation. (R. 1657-1658). Furthermore, the Defendant failed to 
prove any damages as a result of this "breach." (R. 1657-1658). 
9. The Stipulation also provided that the Defendant was to be given a priority 
for any sign permits that may be issued by the City of Coalville in the future, and that the 
Defendant's "priority" be published in the sign policy. (R. 0019). This "priority" pertained 
to off-premise signs along Interstate 80 only. (R. 1658). 
10. After signing the Stipulation, the City of Coalville amended its zoning 
ordinance to prohibit off-premise signs of the type constructed by the Defendant. (See 
Defendant's Addendum). There was nothing in the Stipulation that prohibited this course of 
action. (R. 1660) 
11. The Defendant's priority was not published in the sign policy. (R. 1659). 
12. Because no off-premise sign permits could be issued under the new 
ordinance, the Defendant was not harmed by the City's failure to publish his "priority." 
Additionally, the Defendant failed, at trial to prove any damages sustained as a result of the 
City's failure to publish his priority. He failed to show that any other person had been issued 
an off-premise sign permit for signage along Interstate 80. (R. 1658-1660). 
13. Finally, the Stipulation provided that the City of Coalville would either 
lease or purchase a sign from the Defendant, at the Defendant's cost. The Defendant was 
required by the Stipulation to provide necessary cost information to the City within 30 days 
of the date of the Stipulation so that the City could determine whether to lease or purchase 
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the sign. (R. 0016-0017). No such cost information was provided to the City after the entry 
of the Stipulation. (R. 993). 
14. The City of Coalville did not lease or purchase a sign from the Defendant. 
(R. 993). Defendant was awarded $3,890.00 in damages as a result of Plaintiffs default in 
purchasing or leasing a sign. (R. 993 and 1657). 
15. On December 31, 1985, the Defendant's first sign permit expired, thus 
requiring him to remove one sign of his choosing. (R. 0017 and 991). 
16. In May of 1986, the District Court issued an Order to Show Cause 
requiring the Defendant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for 
failing to comply with the Stipulation and remove a billboard for the permit that expired on 
December 31, 1985. (R. 0034). The Order to Show Cause was heard by Judge Daniels who 
issued an Order Requiring Removal of Billboard Sign on June 23, 1986 after finding that the 
City had substantially complied with the Stipulation. (R. 0065-0066). 
17. Defendant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on the grounds 
that the City of Coalville had not complied with the Stipulation. (R. 0067). 
18. Defendant's Motion was denied in the Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Alter or Amend the Judgment dated September 22, 1986. (R. 0076-0077). 
19. Defendant appealed the matter to the Utah Supreme Court on the grounds 
that the City had failed to comply with the Stipulation and therefore the Defendant should be 
excused from his obligations under the Stipulation. (R. 0082). The Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal as being so unsubstantial as to not warrant further consideration of the 
matter. (R. 0088). 
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20. Since the dismissal of the Appeal, the Defendant has never timely 
complied with the Stipulation which required remove of signs on or before December 31, 
1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993. Legal action on the part of the City has continually been 
required to enforce removal of the signs. In each instance the court has required the 
Defendant to remove a sign in compliance with the Stipulation. (R. 994-995). 
21. This matter came for trial on August 15 and 16, 1995. (R. 990-997 
and 1110). 
22. The trial court determined that the City of Coalville had not materially 
breached the Stipulation. (R. 1655-1661). The court further found that the only breach from 
which the Defendant proved damages was the City's failure to purchase a sign. (R. 1655-
1661). Defendant was made whole by an award of damages in the amount of $3,890.00 for 
the City's failure to purchase a sign. (R. 1657). The Defendant was further awarded pre-
judgment interest from January 1, 1985 to present. (R. 993 and 996). 
23. The trial court found that the claims asserted by the Defendant as a 
defense to his failure to remove the signs did not excuse the Defendant from performing 
under the Stipulation and were therefore without merit and were not asserted in good faith. 
(R. 994-995). The City was awarded attorney's fees in the amount of 516,843.00 as 
recovery of those fees incurred in enforcement of the Stipulation from 1989 to present. (R. 
995 and 997). 
24. The trial court further found that the Defendant had repeatedly violated 
the terms of the Stipulation and was found to be in contempt of court for his willful 
disobedience of a direct court order in which he was directed not to remove a certain 
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billboard which he proceeded to immediately remove. (R. 994 and 1655). The trial court 
determined that as a result of his violations of the Stipulation and Court Order, the Defendant 
did not have clean hands. (R. 1660). 
25. Finally, the trial court found that the Defendant had failed to give timely 
notice of rescission and tender return of consideration received, and that it would be 
impossible to restore the parties to their original positions because the Defendant had been 
enjoying the benefits of the Stipulation for a period of approximately 12 years. (R. 1659-
1660). 
26. The Defendant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. (R. 
1001). Said Motion was denied by Judge Noel on January 3, 1996. (R. 1030-1032). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant is not entitled to rescission of the Stipulation because the City has not 
materially breached the Stipulation. Additionally, rescission is an equitable remedy that 
requires that the Defendant give notice of rescission, the rescinding party must tender back 
whatever consideration they have received, and the rescinding party must adhere to the 
position taken with regard to rescission. The Defendant has failed to do all of these things, 
therefore he is not entitled to rescission. It is also a general rule of the law of rescission that 
it must be possible to restore the parties to their original positions before rescission will be 
granted. Based upon the facts of this case, it is not possible to restore the parties to their 
pre-stipulation positions. Therefore, rescission is not appropriate. Finally, with regard to 
rescission, inasmuch as rescission is an equitable principle, in order for a party to receive 
equity, the party must have done equity. The Court found that the Defendant does not appear 
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before the Utah courts with clean hands. Consequently, the courts should not invoke their 
equitable powers to benefit the Defendant. 
The Defendant also argues that he is entitled to an additional award of damages. This 
claim is not supported by the evidence in that the Defendant has failed to prove any causal 
relationship between the damages he claims to have incurred and the alleged breaches of the 
City. Because he has failed to establish the requisite causal connection, the Defendant is not 
entitled to a further award of damages. The trial court's finding regarding damages should 
be upheld. 
Finally, the Defendant appeals that portion of the Decree that awarded the City of 
Coalville attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the Stipulation against the Defendant from 
1989 to present. This award of fees is based upon Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56. The 
trial court found that the Defendant's claims as defenses to the City's enforcement of the 
Stipulation were without merit and not asserted in good faith. These findings and conclusions 
are supported by the evidence and case law and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
The City of Coalville is appealing that portion of the Decree in which the Defendant 
was awarded pre-judgment interest on the damages awarded for the City's failure to lease or 
purchase a sign. The Defendant should not have been awarded pre-judgment interest because 
the loss could not be fixed as of a definite time. Furthermore, the Defendant delayed 
prosecution of his claims for damages for over 10 years. Therefore, as a matter of equity, 
the Defendant is not entitled to pre-judgment interest. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE EQUITABLE RELIEF 
OF RESCISSION OF THE STIPULATION. 
Defendant in this case is seeking to rescind the Stipulation that was signed by 
the parties and approved by the court in 1983. Despite the fact that the Defendant has been 
granted permits allowing him to maintain his signs along Interstate 80 for the past 13 years, 
the Defendant argues that he is entitled to now rescind the Stipulation. Rescission of a 
contract is an equitable principal designed to put the parties to a rescinded contract back in 
the positions they originally held before entering the contract. Horton v. HortonT 695 P.2d 
102, 107 (Utah 1984). "As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of 
rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there 
has been a material breach of the contract by the other party." Polyglycoat Corp. v. 
Hotcomh. 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). 
The Defendant argues that the City of Coalville has materially breached the Stipulation 
thereby entitling the Defendant to rescission. Whether the Defendant is entitled to rescission 
is dependant on three factors. First, the Defendant is required to prove that the City of 
Coalville materially breached the Stipulation. Second, assuming the Defendant can prove the 
City of Coalville is in material breach of the Stipulation, the Defendant must show that he 
has given proper notice of rescission and that it would be possible to return the parties to 
their original positions. Finally, inasmuch as rescission is an equitable remedy, the 
Defendant must appear before the Court with clean hands before the Court will invoke its 
equitable powers in favor of the Defendant. The Defendant in this case has failed to meet 
any of these criteria, and is, therefore, not entitled to rescind the Stipulation. 
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A. Coalville City is Not in Material Breach of the Stipulation. 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to rescind the Stipulation entered into by the 
parties in 1983 because the City has materially breached the Stipulation. The Defendant 
relies on the general principal of law which states that a party to a contract has a right of 
rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there 
has been a material breach of the contract by the other party. Polyglycoat Corp. v. 
Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). One issue thus becomes whether the City of 
Coalville has materially breached the Stipulation of the parties. According to this Court, 
"whether a particular breach is material is a conclusion of law to be reviewed independently." 
Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Darrell J. Didericksen & 
Sons v. Magna Water. 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980)). However, the concept of what 
constitutes a material breach "depends upon the facts found as to the materiality of the 
breach," and should not be disturbed on appeal if supported by credible evidence. 
Didericksen & Sons v. Magna Water. 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980). See also Saunders 
v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990) (whether there is a material breach of contract, 
and if so, when and by whom constitute issues of fact for the fact tinder); 17A C.J.S. 
Contracts §422(1), at 519 (what constitutes a material or immaterial breach depends on the 
circumstances of the case). 
In court Orders dating back to June 22, 1986, the Utah courts have determined that 
the City of Coalville has substantially complied with the terms of the Stipulation, and 
therefore, the Stipulation is valid, binding, and enforceable. Defendant has repeatedly and 
unsuccessfully alleged that the City should not be entitled to enforce the Stipulation because 
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the City has not complied with its terms. This very issue was appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court in 1986 after the District Court held that the City of Coalville had substantially 
complied with the Stipulation thereby making the Stipulation valid and enforceable against the 
Defendant. The Defendant testified at trial that the appeal in 1986 involved the question of 
the validity of the Stipulation because of the allegations that the City had not performed. (R. 
1596). Said appeal was summarily dismissed on the basis that the grounds for review were 
so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and consideration by the Court, and the 
Stipulation was held to be valid and enforceable. (R. 1596). 
Yet the Defendant is again appearing before the Utah Courts some nine years later 
making virtually the same claims; this time after a two day trial on the issues in which the 
trial court determined that the Stipulation is valid and enforceable despite the City's defaults 
under the Stipulation. After listening to the evidence of the City's alleged "breaches," the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel determined that the City of Coalville had defaulted under the 
Stipulation by its failure to lease or purchase a sign from the Defendant, at the Defendant's 
costs. Judge Noel, as the finder of fact, determined that the Stipulation signed by the parties 
obligated the City of Coalville to either lease or purchase a sign from the Defendant, at the 
Defendant's cost. When the City failed to do so, it was in default under the Stipulation. 
The District Court further found that the Defendant could be made whole for this 
breach by an award of damages. (R. 1657). Therefore, this was not a breach sufficient to 
justify a rescission of the entire contract. (R. 1657). This finding is clearly supported by the 
evidence. The Stipulation required that the City of Coalville either lease or purchase a sign 
from the Defendant. The Defendant has stated in numerous memoranda and court documents 
14 
that the reason he wanted the City to be required to either lease or purchase a sign is so that 
he could recoup some of the costs of constructing and installing at least one of the sign 
structures that he was going to be obligated to remove by virtue of the Stipulation. (See eg. 
R. 0467). The Court determined that since the Defendant could be made whole by an award 
of damages, the City's failure to purchase or lease a sign did not go to the consideration of 
the Stipulation. Therefore rescission is not a justifiable remedy for the City's failure to 
purchase or lease a sign. 
The Defendant further alleges that the City materially breached the Stipulation by 
failing to issue proper permits to the Defendant. The Defendant claims that the permits 
issued by Coalville are invalid because they were improperly issued and they purport to order 
the sequence of removal of the signs in violation of the Stipulation. The facts show that the 
City has never challenged the validity of the permits; the Defendant has never asked the City 
to reissue the permits; the City has not sought to order the sequence of removal of the signs; 
and the Defendant has been permitted to maintain his signs along the Interstate for as long as 
he has a valid permit, in other words, the Defendant has reaped the benefits of the 
Stipulation for the past 13 years. Yet, he now seeks to rescind the Stipulation because he 
claims the City has materially breached the Stipulation by failing to issue valid permits. 
Pursuant to the Stipulation, it was agreed that the City would issue the Defendant a 
permit for each sign. Each permit would have an expiration date. Each time a permit 
expired the Defendant agreed that he would remove one sign. The parties agreed that the 
Defendant would be permitted to choose the sequence of the sign removal. In other words, 
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the Defendant could apply any permit to any sign. The only requirement was that he remove 
one sign for each permit that expired. 
The City of Coalville issued the sign permits to the Defendant before the removal of 
the first sign. The permits were issued by the Mayor of Coalville at the time, Merlyn 
Johnson. The permits contained expiration dates as contemplated by the Stipulation, but 
were also tied to specific sign locations thereby implying that the sequence of removal would 
be dictated by the City of Coalville. The Defendant claims that the sign permits are invalid 
because of how they were issued, and because the purported to sequence the order of removal 
of the signs. 
The 1983 Zoning Ordinance which took effect in 1984 prohibited off-premise signs, 
and required that permits be issued by the Zoning Administrator. Therefore, the Defendant 
alleges that the permits issued by the City are invalid because they were issued by the Mayor 
rather than the Zoning Administrator, and because the Ordinance prohibits off-premise signs 
like the Defendant's. This argument is flawed for several reasons. 
First, the City Council read and approved the Stipulation prior to authorizing the 
Mayor to sign the same. By the terms of the Stipulation, the City Council knew that it was 
agreeing to issue the Defendant permits for his nine signs. When the Mayor issued the 
permits to the Defendant in 1986, he was merely following through with what the City 
Council agreed to do in 1983. When the City Council agreed to issue the permits they were 
operating under the previous zoning ordinance in which the City Council or its delegated 
representative could issue permits. Furthermore, and more importantly, the City Council has 
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never challenged the validity of the permits, and has always permitted the Defendant to 
maintain the signs for which he has permits even though they were issued by the Mayor. 
Additionally, the Defendant argues that because the permits were issued in 1986, after 
the new zoning ordinance was in effect, they are invalid because off-premise signs are not 
permitted under the new ordinance. Defendant further argues that the City breached the 
covenant of good faith and dealing when it changed the ordinance in 1983 to prohibit off-
premise signs. This argument is not grounded in fact. While it is true that the City amended 
the ordinance in 1983 to prohibit off-premise signs, the City did not attempt to avoid its 
obligation to issue permits to the Defendant as a result of this change in the ordinance. On 
the contrary, the City issued the Defendant permits for his signs as agreed to under the 
Stipulation, and as permitted under the "old" zoning ordinance. Again, the City has never 
challenged the validity of the permits. 
The Defendant also argues that the permits are not valid because the purport to order 
the sequence of removal in violation of the Stipulation. However, the uncontroverted 
evidence shows that the City has never been interested in mandating the order in which the 
signs come down. In fact, the City did not seek removal of any particular sign beyond the 
first demand letter in which the attorney for Coalville asked that sign location number one be 
removed since its permit had expired. The City of Coalville did not care about the order of 
removal, merely that one sign be removed each time a permit expired. (R. 1625). 
Additionally, in the first court order enforcing the Stipulation against the Defendant, the 
Court ordered that the Defendant could choose the signs for removal. 
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The Defendant argues that this facial deficiency hampered his marketing abilities 
because he was unable to show potential clients that he could provide sign space to them for a 
number of years. Had this issue really posed a problem for the Defendant he could have 
done one of two things. First, the Defendant could have shown prospective advertisers the 
Court Order that provided that the Defendant was able to choose which signs were to be 
removed. Alternatively, the Defendant could have asked the City to reissue the permits to 
correctly reflect the agreement in the Stipulation and the court order. The Defendant did 
neither of the foregoing, but is before this court alleging that the City materially breached the 
Stipulation by issuing invalid permits. The evidence in this case does not support the 
Defendant's allegation that this was a material breach of the Stipulation and the Defendant 
has failed to prove any damages he incurred as a result of this alleged breach. (R. 1657). 
The Defendant's argument that he was damaged because he had to go back to court to 
obtain a Court Order "to get that for which he bargained" is wholly without merit. The 
Defendant was back in court on an Order to Show Cause hearing brought by the City to 
enforce the Stipulation. The provision relating to sequencing removal of the signs was 
merely included in the Court's order for clarification. Defendant did not initiate the court 
proceeding, nor was he damaged in any other way as a result of the permits. The problems 
with the permits do not in any way constitute a material breach of the Stipulation that would 
warrant rescission. 
Finally, the Defendant alleges that the City of Coalville materially breached the 
Stipulation when it failed to publish the "Defendant's priority for sign permits" in the 
published sign policy of the City. The trial court determined that under the terms of the 
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Stipulation, the City agreed that the Defendant would be entitled to a priority for any "off-
premise" sign permits issued by the City. The Stipulation provided as follows: 
13. It is agreed and understood between the Plaintiff and Defendant that if the 
Plaintiff City issues sign permits in the future, the Defendant, by virtue of its 
existing signs, will have priority over any applicant who does not have an 
existing sign, and the Plaintiff agrees to take whatever steps are necessary to 
insure that this priority for existing signs is made a part of the published sign 
policy of the Plaintiff City. 
The trial court determined that this provision in the Stipulation was ambiguous with regard to 
what type of permits the Defendant was to be granted a priority for. Therefore, extrinsic 
evidence was permitted to determine the intent of the parties with regard to this provision. 
Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985). The trial court heard evidence from the 
Defendant and the drafters of the document. 
The Defendant asserted that this provision gave him a priority for any sign permit 
issued by the City including permits for on-premise signs. (R. 1433-1437). On premise 
signs are those signs that are located on the premises of the business they advertise (ie. a 
grocery store sign). The Defendant's former counsel, on the other hand, testified that this 
priority was for off-premise sign permits. (R. 1627-1629). Similarly, the City's former 
counsel testified that it was the intent of the parties that the priority for sign permits be for 
any permits for signs to be constructed and installed along Interstate 80. (R. 1200). Based 
on the testimony of the witnesses, Judge Noel determined that it was the intent of the parties 
that the priority referred to in the Stipulation pertained to a priority for permits for off-
premise signs along Interstate 80. In other words, if the City were to issue any permits for 
signs to be constructed and installed along Interstate 80, the Defendant would have a priority 
for those permits. 
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As stated above the Stipulation required not only that the Defendant be given a 
priority for off-premise sign permits, but also that the priority be published in the sign policy 
of the City. The trial court determined that the City had failed to comply with this 
requirement of the Stipulation. However, the court determined that the Defendant had 
proved no damages resulting from this breach. (R. 1659-1661). The Defendant could not 
and did not present any evidence that any other party was given an off-premise permit for 
signs along Interstate 80. (R. 1659). Additionally, inasmuch as the City amended the zoning 
ordinance to prohibit off-premise signs, the court determined that no useful purpose would be 
served by requiring the City to now publish the "priority." Finally, the court determined that 
there was nothing in the Stipulation to prevent the City from amending its ordinance. As 
demonstrated above, the City did not seek to avoid its obligations under the Stipulation as a 
result of the amendment of the zoning ordinance. Therefore, Defendant was not harmed by 
the zoning amendment, and the City did not breach any covenant of good faith as alleged by 
the Defendant. Because the Defendant was not harmed by the City's failure to publish the 
priority, the breach cannot be considered a material breach. The Defendant, is therefore, not 
entided to rescission of the Stipulation. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449, 451 
(Utah 1979). 
The findings of the trial court with regard to the materiality of the City's breaches are 
dearly supported by the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal Didericksen & 
Sons v. Magna Water. 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980). See also Saunders v. Sharp, 793 
P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990) (whether there is a material breach of contract, and if so, when 
and by whom constitute issues of fact for the fact finder.) The City has not materially 
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breached the Stipulation. Therefore, the Defendant is not entitled to rescission of the 
Stipulation. 
B. Defendant is Not Entitled to Rescission Because the Parties Cannot be Restored 
to Their Original Positions and Defendant Failed to Give Proper Notice of 
Rescission. 
In the case at bar, it has been determined after a two day trial and in numerous court 
orders, that Coalville City has not materially breached the Stipulation. Therefore, under the 
laws of contract rescission the Defendant is not entitled to rescind the contract. 
Even assuming the Defendant could show that the City had materially breached the 
Stipulation, rescission is generally not available if the parties cannot be restored to their 
original positions, 50 W. Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency. 784 P.2d 1162, 1170-1 
(Utah 1989), citing 17 AmJur.2d Contracts § 514, at 998 (1964). The City of Coalville has 
issued permits to the Defendant enabling him to maintain his signs along Interstate 80 for the 
past 13 years. Additionally, the Defendant has been enjoying the benefit of the Stipulation 
by maintaining his signs along Interstate 80 and collecting advertising income from those 
signs since 1983. Because the Defendant has retained the benefit of the Stipulation since 
1983, it would be impossible to restore the parties to their original, pre-stipulation positions. 
Furthermore, rescission is an equitable remedy. In order to obtain rescission of a 
contract, notice of rescission must be given to the opposing party, the rescinding party must 
tender back whatever consideration they have received in a timely fashion, and the rescinding 
party must adhere to the position taken. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 435. In this case the 
Defendant failed to give timely notice of rescission; failed to tender back the permits issued 
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by the City; and conveniently only sought rescission of the Stipulation sporadically, as it 
suited him. in other words, the Defendant did not adhere to his position relating to 
rescission. On the contrary, throughout the history of this lawsuit the Defendant has 
alternated between seeking to enforce the terms of the Stipulation against the City, and 
seeking rescission of the Stipulation. General contract law provides that: 
"a party know facts which would entitle him to rescind a contract, may waive 
the right to rescind by accepting benefits under the contract, or by electing to 
proceed with its performance, or by otherwise continuing to treat the contract 
as a subsisting obligation. Likewise, a party my waive the right to rescind a 
contract by bringing an action to enforce it." 
17A C.J.S. Contracts §443, at 556. The Defendant has waived any right to rescission by 
seeking to enforce the Stipulation against the City on numerous occasions, and by accepting 
the benefits of the Stipulation for the past 12 years. (R. 134-138 and 172-208 and 380-384). 
Based upon the history of this lawsuit rescission is not an available remedy. 
C. Defendant is not Entitled to Rescission Because He is not Before the Court 
with Clean Hands. 
Finally, because rescission is an equitable remedy, in order for a party to be granted 
equity, he must have done equity. Horton v. Horton. 695 P.2d at 107 (Utah 1984). In the 
case at bar, the trial court determined that the Defendant is not entitled to rescission because 
he does not come before the court with clean hands in that he has repeatedly violated the 
terms of the Stipulation, and he willfully and knowingly disobeyed a lawful court order, and 
was, therefore in contempt of court. (R. 1660-1661). In order to receive equity from the 
court, one must have done equity. In this case the Defendant has come before the court with 
unclean hands and should not be entitled to invoke the Court's equitable powers in his favor. 
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II. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL AWARD OF 
DAMAGES BECAUSE HE HAS FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGES 
INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE CITY'S BREACHES. 
The Defendant alleges that he is entitled to an award of damages beyond the 
$3,890.00 awarded by the trial court. This issue concerns the District Court's Findings of 
Fact regarding damages proved by the Defendant. The District Court found that the 
Defendant had failed to prove any damages resulting from the City's breaches of the 
Stipulation. Defendant is required to marshall all of the evidence that supports the District 
Court's finding and then must demonstrate that the finding is clearly erroneous. Saunders v. 
Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball. 786 P.2d 
760, 761 (Utah 1990). 
The Defendant asserts that his claims and "evidence" relating to damages were 
uncontested at trial and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in denying his claims for 
damages. However, the issue is not whether the City refuted the Defendant's claims for 
damages. The issue is whether the Defendant proved a causal relationship between his so-
called damages and the alleged breaches of the City. 
The evidence of damages presented by the Defendant at trial was memorialized in 
Trial Exhibit #36 and the testimony of the Defendant and his "expert witness." Exhibit 
#36 is a series of calculations prepared by the Defendant in which the Defendant enumerates 
the amount of revenue lost by virtue of the fact that the Defendant was required to remove 
signs pursuant to the Stipulation. The trial court determined that all of the damages listed on 
Exhibit #36 resulted not from the alleged breaches of the City, but rather from the Defendant 
having to remove the signs he agreed to remove pursuant to the Stipulation. (R. 1661). 
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Additionally, the Defendant's expert witness testified only to the value of the signs if 
the signs were permitted to remain in perpetuity. The Defendant and his "expert" failed to 
show any damages sustained as a result of the City improperly assigning the permits to 
particular signs. The Defendant and his "expert" failed to show any damages sustained as a 
result of the City's failure to publish the Defendant's priority for sign permits. The only 
damages that were incurred as a result of a breach by the City were those incurred by the 
City's failure to purchase or lease a sign. The Defendant was awarded these damages by the 
District Court. The Defendant is not entitled to any further damages, and the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant any further damages. The trial court's 
denial of additional damages should be upheld. 
HI. COALVILLE CITY IS ENTITLED TO RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE STIPULATION. 
The Defendant alleges that the trial court improperly awarded attorney's fees incurred 
by the City in the enforcement of the Stipulation. The award for attorney's fcts was based 
on Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1995). Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code 
Annotated provides that: 
"(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith..." 
In this matter, the trial court determined, after listening to all the evidence put forth by both 
the City and the Defendant in a two day trial, that the defenses asserted in response to the 
City's efforts to enforce the Stipulation were without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
(R. 994-995). Therefore, the City of Coalville is entitled to recover those attorney's fees 
expended in enforcement of the Stipulation. 
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A. Defendant's Claims as Defenses to Enforcement of the Stipulation Were 
Without Merit. 
In August, 1995, the trial court determined that the defenses asserted by the Defendant 
in response to the City's efforts to enforce the Stipulation were without merit. (R. 994-995). 
The issue of whether the Defendant's claims were "without merit" is a question of law to be 
reviewed for correctness. Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993). This Court 
has considered the meaning of "without merit" in Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1983). In Cady. this Court said that the term "without merit" implies bordering on frivolity. 
Frivolous is defined by the dictionary as "of little weight or importance having no basis in 
law or fact." This Court in Cady uses this definition and goes on to hold that because the 
Plaintiffs had no legal basis for recovery, their claims were without merit. 
Similarly in the case at bar, the Defendant has enjoyed the benefit of the Stipulation 
for over 12 years by being issued permits to maintain his signs along Interstate 80. Yet each 
time the Defendant is obligated to perform under the Stipulation by removing a sign whose 
permit has expired, the Defendant asserts that the City has failed to comply with the 
Stipulation so that the Defendant is excused from performance. In 1986 and 1987 the Third 
District Court and the Supreme Court of Utah (by virtue of the Remittitur), determined that 
the City's defaults under the Stipulation did not excuse the Defendant from his obligation to 
perform under the Stipulation. The City has substantially performed under the Stipulation. 
Defendant, therefore, had no legal basis for bringing these same defenses to the City's efforts 
to enforce the Stipulation each time a permit expired over the next 8 years. Therefore, by 
the definition adopted by the Supreme Court in Cady v. Johnson, the Defendant's defenses 
were without merit. 
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The Defendant asserts that the court cannot hold that a claim has no merit, and then 
rule for that party and award damages to that party. However, in stating the issue in this 
manner, the Defendant has mischaracterized the trial court's ruling. The trial court held that 
the Defendant was entitled to a monetary judgment for the City's failure to purchase a sign. 
The trial court also held that the City's failure to purchase a sign did not excuse the 
Defendant from removing one sign every two years as the permits expired, but rather only 
entitled Defendant to a monetary judgment. There is no inconsistency in the trial court's 
findings. While Defendant prevailed on his claim for monetary damages for the City's 
failure to purchase a sign, the Defendant had no legal basis to assert that the City's non-
material breaches excused the Defendant from his obligations under the Stipulation. 
Therefore, the Defendant's defenses to the City's enforcement of the Stipulation are without 
merit. 
B. The Defendant Lacked Good Faith in Asserting his Defenses to the City's 
Efforts to Enforce the Stipulation. 
The final statutory requirement for recovery of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56 of the 
Utah Code is that the defenses or claims must n£i have been brought or asserted in good 
faith. According to Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this is a question 
of fact to be reviewed by the appellate court under a "clearly erroneous" standard. To be 
lacking good faith, one must prove that one or more of the elements of good faith is lacking. 
Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). Good faith is defined as: 
"(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that 
the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay or defraud others." I(L 
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In the case at hand, the trial court found that the Defendant lacked good faith when he 
brought his defenses to the City's efforts to enforce the Stipulation. Defendant has never 
removed a sign whose pennit has expired without the City first bringing legal action to force 
such removal. Yet in every instance, the Defendant has been ordered to remove a sign. In 
other words, despite the fact that the Defendant has been ordered to remove a sign for each 
and every permit that has expired, the Defendant fails and refuses to remove any signs 
without legal action being required on the part of the City. Clearly, this pattern of activity 
establishes that the Defendant intends to, or knows that his activities will hinder and delay the 
City. In fact, given that the Defendant has always been required to remove a sign for each 
permit that has expired, the Defendant knows that only effect his actions will have is to 
hinder or delay the City. Furthermore, Defendant refuses to remove signs when due, not 
because he has some meritorious defense to the removal of a sign, but rather because the 
Defendant benefits from each delay in the form of lease payments received from advertisers. 
Defendant is taking unconscionable advantage of Coalville City by his continual refusal to 
remove his signs. Inasmuch as the City of Coalville has always prevailed on its claims for 
enforcement of the Stipulation, Defendant's refusal to comply is clearly in bad faith, and his 
reasons for refusal are without merit. As determined by the trial court, Coalville City is 
entitled to attorney's fees under §78-27-56 of the Utah Code. 
IV. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT 
FOR THE CITY'S FAILURE TO PURCHASE A SIGN. 
The Defendant is not entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount of damages 
awarded for the City's failure to purchase a sign. This issue involves a question of law in 
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which this court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness without according 
them any particular deference. James Constructors v. Salt Lake City. 888 P.2d 665, 671 
(Utah App. 1994). 
Prejudgment interest can be awarded when the loss is fixed at a particular time, and 
the amount of the loss can be fixed with accuracy. IdL In this case the Defendant's loss 
sustained as a result of the City's failure to lease or purchase a sign cannot be fixed at a 
particular time. In the stipulation no time for the City's performance was specified. The 
Stipulation merely required that "when the Plaintiff determines to either lease or purchase the 
sign, Defendant agrees to provide and erect the sign face within sixty (60) days after 
notification by Defendant to proceed." The City was not required to purchase a sign from 
the defendant within a specific time period. Since there is no particular time from which to 
award prejudgment interest, it is not appropriate in this case. 
More importantly, however, the Defendant should not be awarded pre-judgment 
interest in this case because the Defendant delayed prosecution of his claims for damages for 
several years. In Nielson v. Droubay. 652 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court denied prejudgment interest on the successful counterclaim of the Defendant where a 
substantial number of the delays in a long-pending case were at the instance or agreed to by 
the Defendant. In Nielson the Defendant was precluded from receiving prejudgment interest 
where he otherwise would have been entitled because of his delays in prosecuting the case. 
In this case, the City's only complaint has been the timely removal of the Defendant's 
signs pursuant to the Stipulation. The Defendant's first permit expired in 1985, the City 
brought an action to enforce the Stipulation. Defendant should have prosecuted his assertion 
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that the Plaintiff had materially breached the stipulation at that time. Defendant sought to 
have the orders enforcing the stipulation modified, and took his case to the Supreme Court of 
Utah who dismissed the appeal. Defendant should have sought an order requiring the City to 
pay damages for failure to buy a sign at that time—after the Defendant knew the Stipulation 
was valid and enforceable, and after the Defendant knew the City intended to enforce the 
stipulation. However, the Defendant did not seek such order. 
Rather than prosecuting his action for damages as a result of the City's failure to purchase a 
sign in a timely manner, the Defendant has requested continuance after continuance, and has 
failed for over 10 years to prosecute his claims for damages against the City. As a result of 
Defendant's substantial delays to enforce the terms of the Stipulation against the City, he 
should be precluded from recovering prejudgment interest on the damages incurred as a result 
of the City's failure to purchase a sign. This would be in accordance with the Court's 
holding in Nielson. Based upon his delay in prosecution and the fact that Defendant's loss 
cannot be fixed as of a particular time, the Defendant is not entitied to pre-judgment interest 
and the trial court's award of the same should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is not entitled to rescission of the Stipulation. Defendant has failed to 
prove any additional damages to which he would be entitled. The trial court's decision with 
regard to the issues of enforceability of the Stipulation and award of attorney's fees to 
Coalville should be affirmed. The trial court's decision regarding pre-judgment interest 
should be reversed. 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no addendum is 
included in the Appellee's Brief. All relevant portions of the record on appeal can be found 
in the Appellant's Brief. All relevant statutory provisions not included in the Appellant's 
Brief are reproduced verbatim in the Appellee's Brief. 
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